The Government Accountability Office (GAO) has issued its second statutorily-mandated report regarding implementation of the Medicare Improvements for Patients and Providers Act of 2008 (MIPPA) accreditation requirement for Medicare suppliers that furnish the technical component of advanced diagnostic imaging (ADI) services. The first report assessed CMS's standards for ADI accreditation and the agency’s oversight of the accreditation requirement. In the second report, "Medicare Imaging Accreditation: Effect on Access to Advanced Diagnostic Imaging Is Unclear amid Other Policy Changes," the GAO concentrates on the Medicare beneficiary impact of the accreditation requirement, focusing on beneficiary use of magnetic resonance imaging, computed tomography, and nuclear medicine (including positron emission tomography services). The GAO found that the number of such ADI services provided to Medicare beneficiaries in the office setting declined at similar rates both before and after the accreditation requirement went into effect on January 1, 2012, which suggests that the overall decline was driven at least in part by factors other than accreditation. The GAO also observed that the effect of accreditation on access is unclear given the other recent policy changes implemented by CMS and private payers (e.g., payment reductions and prior authorization requirements) that also could have contributed to the decline in the number of these services. CMS officials, accrediting organization representatives, and accredited ADI suppliers that the GAO interviewed suggested that any effect of accreditation on access was likely limited.
On April 8, 2014, the OIG and GAO each issued reports focusing on different aspects of the “Round 1 Rebid” of the Medicare durable medical equipment, prosthetics, orthotics, and supplies (DMEPOS) competitive bidding program. By way of background, under DMEPOS competitive bidding, only suppliers that are winning bidders, meet licensing and other standards, and enter into a contract with CMS may furnish selected categories of DMEPOS to Medicare beneficiaries in competitive bidding areas (CBAs), with very limited exceptions. Contract suppliers are paid based on the median of the winning suppliers’ bids in the CBA, rather than the DMEPOS fee schedule amount. The Round 1 Rebid was in effect for a 3-year period, from 2011 through 2013, involving nine DME product categories in nine CBAs. CMS subsequently “recompeted” contracts in the Round 1 areas (including additional products), with three-year contracts effective January 1, 2014. CMS also established a second round of bidding covering 100 CBAs, along with a national mail-order diabetic testing supplies competitive bidding program; those three-year contracts went into effect July 1, 2013.
The OIG report assesses CMS compliance with DMEPOS bidding rules in the Round 1 Rebid. The OIG concluded that CMS generally followed its competitive bidding program rules when it selected suppliers and computed single payment amounts for the Round 1 Rebid – although a number of CMS errors were identified. Specifically, the OIG conducted a review based on a random sample of 100 of the 3,011 established DMEPOS single payment amounts in the Round 1 Rebid Program and the selection process for 266 winning suppliers associated with the sampled payment amounts. The OIG determined that CMS followed all applicable requirements for 255 of the 266 winning suppliers, but nine winning suppliers did not meet financial documentation requirements, and CMS incorrectly used two suppliers in one single payment computation. While the OIG characterizes the overall effect on Medicare payments to suppliers as “immaterial,” the OIG estimates that CMS paid suppliers $34,000 less than they would have received without any errors (less than 0.1 percent of the $113 million paid under the Round 1 Rebid Program during the first 6 months of 2011). The OIG recommends that CMS: (1) follow its established program procedures and applicable federal requirements consistently in evaluating the financial documents of all suppliers, and (2) ensure that all bids of winning suppliers are included in the calculation of single payment amounts before offering contracts. CMS concurred with the recommendations, and pointed out that it has enhanced the financial review process to ensure that all reviewers are accountants or certified public accountants. Looking ahead, the OIG will be conducting a similar analysis for Round 2 of competitive bidding; this analysis may include an analysis of CMS’s procedures for ensuring supplier compliance with applicable state licensure requirements (depending on the results of an ongoing limited scope review).
The GAO issued a broader review focusing on data from the second year of the Round 1 Rebid contracts, covering the Round 1 Rebid’s effects on Medicare beneficiaries, contract suppliers, and non-contract suppliers. Among other things, the GAO observed that:
- The number of beneficiaries furnished DME items included in the competitive bidding program generally decreased more in CBAs than in demographically similar “comparator” areas. CMS suggests that such declines may be attributable to reduced inappropriate usage of DME and do not necessarily reflect beneficiary access issues. In fact, CMS stated in comments on the report that its “sophisticated real-time claims monitoring system has continuously found that beneficiary access to all necessary and appropriate competitive bid items has been preserved since the program began” – a conclusion generally disputed by industry.
- A small number of contract suppliers generally had a large proportion of the market share in the nine competitive bidding areas.
- The total number of DME suppliers and Medicare allowed charges decreased more in CBAs than in the comparator areas. For instance, the number of suppliers with Medicare allowed charge amounts of $2,500 or more per quarter decreased an average of 27% in the CBAs compared to 5% in the comparator areas.
- The number of grandfathered suppliers had so diminished that CMS was no longer monitoring them after the second quarter of 2012.
- The program did not appear to have adversely affected beneficiary access to covered items, although additional monitoring would be needed to monitor the impact of the national mail-order diabetic testing supplies program and Round 2.
The GAO recently issued a report on CMS efforts to implement Medicaid drug pricing reforms mandated by the Affordable Care Act (ACA). Specifically, the report discusses CMS development of the National Average Drug Acquisition Cost (NADAC) benchmark of retail pharmacy acquisition costs, and how NADAC amounts compare to ACA-based federal upper limits (FULs). Based on first quarter 2013 data, GAO found that draft FUL amounts calculated under the ACA formula were about 1.4% lower than the total NADAC amount in aggregate for 1,035 outpatient drugs. On the other hand, ACA-based FULs for individual drugs ranged from 96% lower than to 404% higher than the NADACs for the same drugs. The GAO also found large differences between the total ACA-based FUL amount and the total NADAC amount for generic and for branded generic versions. According to the GAO, total ACA-based FUL amount for the generic versions was 19% higher than the total NADAC amount, but for the branded generic versions the ACA FUL amount was 26% lower than the NADAC.
The GAO concluded that CMS is close to having a formula under which FULs would better reflect pharmacy acquisition costs, but it observes that CMS continues to apply FULs that were calculated more than four years ago. The GAO also observed that the relationship between ACA-based FULs and NADACs may be affected by factors such as rebates and discounts that are not reflected on pharmacy invoices, which will necessitate continued CMS monitoring. The GAO therefore recommended that CMS (1) expeditiously implement the ACA-based FUL formula and (2) monitor the relationship between the ACA-based FULs and the NADACs on an ongoing basis. HHS concurred with these recommendations; noting that it intends to finalize the ACA Medicaid FULs for multiple source drugs in July 2014 (CMS indicated to GAO that the agency was still considering how the ACA-based FULs would apply to branded generic versions in the final rule).
On February 10, the House Energy and Commerce Subcommittee on Health held a hearing entitled “Examining Drug Shortages and Recent Efforts to Address Them.” In connection with the hearing, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) released a report that concluded that the number of shortages remains high, even though the FDA has taken steps to prevent and mitigate shortages (e.g., expediting application reviews and inspections, exercising enforcement discretion in appropriate cases, and helping manufacturers respond to quality problems). Some of the causes of shortages are beyond the agency’s authority, however, since the FDA “does not have control over private companies’ business decisions,” and cannot, for example, require manufacturers to start producing or continue producing drugs, or to build redundant manufacturing capacity. Nevertheless, the GAO called on the FDA to strengthen its internal controls over its drug shortage data, conduct periodic analyses to routinely and systematically assess drug shortage information, and use this information to proactively identify drug shortage risk factors.
GAO Report Confirms Insurance Coverage Prior to Medicare Linked to Better Health, Lower Program Spending
This post was written by Nancy Sheliga.
The Government Accountability Office (GAO) has released a report examining the effect of prior health insurance coverage on Medicare beneficiaries. The report specifically focuses on the health status, program spending, and use of services by Medicare beneficiaries with and without continuous health insurance coverage before Medicare enrollment. According to the GAO, Medicare beneficiaries with prior insurance initially used fewer or less costly medical services than those without prior insurance. Because the difference in total spending was the greatest during the first year in Medicare, the GAO hypothesizes that beneficiaries without prior continuous insurance may have had a pent-up demand for medical services in anticipation of coverage at age 65. In addition, the report finds that beneficiaries without prior continuous insurance have higher total and institutional outpatient spending but not higher spending for physician and other noninstitutional services, suggesting that they require more costly and intensive medical services or that they are continuing prior patterns of visiting hospitals more than physician offices. Finally, in line with previous research, the GAO found that beneficiaries with continuous health insurance coverage for approximately six years before enrolling in Medicare were more likely than those without prior continuous insurance to report being in good health during their first six years in Medicare.
A recent GAO report assesses the effectiveness of Medicare Zone Program Integrity Contractors (ZPICs) -- contractors that perform program integrity activities designed to fight Medicare fraud, waste, and abuse. While the GAO notes that ZPICs take credit for over $250 million in Medicare savings in 2012 from actions such as stopping payment on suspect claims, the GAO observes that CMS would benefit from more data on whether quicker ZPIC action would lead to greater savings. The GAO therefore recommends that CMS (1) collect and evaluate information on the timeliness of ZPICs' investigative and administrative actions, and (2) develop ZPIC performance measures explicitly linking ZPICs' work to Medicare program integrity performance measures and goals.
This post was written by Nancy Sheliga.
At the request of Senate Republican policymakers seeking a better understanding regarding the impact of supplemental coverage on overall Medicare spending, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) recently compared the health care expenditures of beneficiaries with only traditional fee-for-service (FFS) Medicare coverage to those of beneficiaries who have supplemental coverage from either private insurance companies (a.k.a., Medigap) or employer-sponsored plans. Based on a review of 2010 data, the GAO concluded that health care expenditures are higher for beneficiaries with supplemental coverage than for beneficiaries with FFS Medicare only. More specifically, both average Medicare spending and out-of-pocket expenses for beneficiaries with Medigap were significantly greater than for those with Medicare FFS coverage only. Within the FFS only group, those who are enrolled in Medicare's Part D prescription drug program spent considerably more on health care than those who are not enrolled in Part D.
While other research has found similar patterns, and Congressional policymakers have expressed concern that those with supplemental coverage may be less cost-conscious in their use of medical services, the GAO report also found that those with poorer health status and greater age have higher average health care expenditures in general. In addition, the GAO report references other past studies that have indicated that (1) characteristics such as health status and age may influence the decision to purchase supplemental coverage, possibly providing a partial explanation of the differences in expenditures, and (2) reducing supplemental coverage may cause some individuals to consider forgoing necessary services, possibly exacerbating their health care needs and perhaps increasing their long-term health care costs.
Medicare electronic health records (EHR) incentive payments to hospitals and health care professionals topped $6.3 billion for 2012 – more than twice the $2.3 billion awarded for 2011 -- according to a GAO report entitled Electronic Health Records: Number and Characteristics of Providers Awarded Medicare Incentive Payments for 2011-2012. The proportion of eligible hospitals and professionals receiving payments also grew from 2011 to 2011, with 48% of eligible hospitals (2,291) receiving payments in 2012 compared to 777 hospitals (16%) in 2011. For 2012, 31% of eligible professionals (183,712) were awarded payments, up from 10% (58,331) in 2011. Among hospitals and professionals awarded an incentive payment for 2012, the largest proportions were in the South, the smallest proportions were in the West, and a majority were in urban areas. More than four-fifths of the hospitals were acute care hospitals and three-fifths were nonprofit hospitals, while more than half of professionals were specialty practice physicians.
The Government Accountability Office (GAO) has issued two reports on trends in physician referrals to entities in which the provider or the provider's family members have a financial interest – both of which conclude that financial incentives are likely a major factor driving increases in referrals. In the first report, “Medicare: Action Needed to Address Higher Use of Anatomic Pathology Services by Providers Who Self-Refer,” the GAO concentrates on three provider specialties -- dermatology, gastroenterology, and urology -- that in 2010 accounted for 90% of referrals for self-referred anatomic pathology services (the preparation and examination of tissue samples to diagnose disease). Among other things, the report found that referrals for anatomic pathology services by these specialists (specifically services represented by CPT code 88305) substantially increased the year after they began to self-refer, compared both to before they started self-referring and to those specialists who continued to self-refer or never self-referred services. Self-referring providers of these specialties also referred more services on average than non-self-referring providers, even taking into account geography and patient characteristics. In response to the GAO’s suggestion that CMS improve its ability to identify self-referred anatomic pathology services and limit financial incentives for high levels of referrals, HHS notes that it identified CPT code 88305 as a potentially misvalued code and reduced its reimbursement by approximately 30% percent in 2013, which HHS believes has significantly reduced the financial incentives associated with self-referral for these procedures.
In a second report, “Higher Use of Costly Prostate Cancer Treatment by Providers Who Self-Refer Warrants Scrutiny,” the GAO examined self-referral of prostate cancer-related intensity-modulated radiation therapy (IMRT) services. According to the GAO, from 2006 to 2010, the number of IMRT procedures performed by self-referring groups increased rapidly (from about 80,000 to 366,000), while it declined for non-self-referring groups. This growth in self-referred services was primarily due to limited-specialty groups, particularly urologists, rather than multispecialty groups. Self-referring groups also were more likely to refer their patients for IMRT than other less costly treatments (e.g., radical prostatectomy or brachytherapy). Because Medicare providers are generally not required to disclose that they self-refer IMRT services, the GAO states that “beneficiaries may not be aware that their provider has a financial interest in recommending IMRT over alternative treatments that may be equally effective, have different risks and side effects, and are less expensive for Medicare and beneficiaries.” The GAO recommended that CMS require providers to disclose their financial interests in IMRT to their patients; which HHS does not support because, among other things, it could be complex to administer and would not address overutilization. HHS also noted that the President has proposed excluding certain services from the in-office ancillary services exception to the physician self-referral law.
A new bill introduced in the House on August 1, 2013 by Congresswoman Jackie Speier (D-CA) and Congressman Jim McDermott (D-WI) would dramatically narrow the in-office ancillary services (IOAS) exception to the Stark law for physician groups performing imaging, pathology radiation therapy and physical therapy services. The bill (“Promoting Integrity of Medicare Act of 2013”) would amend the IOAS exception by excluding “specified non-ancillary services” from its protection. Initially, the bill identifies the following services as “non-ancillary services” excluded from the IOAS exception: (a) pathology services; (b) radiation therapy services and supplies; (c) advanced imaging services (i.e., CT, MRI and PET); and (d) physical therapy services. If adopted, the bill would prohibit, for example, a physician ordering advanced imaging services for a Medicare beneficiary if the services are performed in the ordering physician’s offices. However, referrals of low-end imaging, such as x-ray or ultrasound, would still fall within the IOAS exception.
In addition, the bill would require enhanced CMS review of so-called “non-ancillary services” to identify those creating a high risk of Stark Law noncompliance, including using prepayment reviews, claims audits, focused medical review, or computer algorithms. The bill would also create higher penalties for referrals of “non-ancillary services” by imposing upon those referrals civil monetary penalties that are greater than the penalties currently authorized for other violations of the Stark law.
The bill was introduced after others in the federal government have criticized self-referral. A September 2012 study by the Government Accounting Office found that the number of advanced imaging services ordered by physicians increased when the services were performed in the referring physician’s office. The GAO recommended that CMS improve its ability to identify self-referral of advanced imaging services and address increases in these services. More recently, the Obama Administration’s proposed federal budget for fiscal year 2014 suggested excluding radiation therapy, therapy services, and advanced imaging from the IOAS exception, except in cases where a practice meets certain accountability standards. No action on the bill, the GAO recommendation or the Obama budget has been taken to date.
The GAO has issued two reports on the status of federal and state efforts to establish health insurance exchanges under the ACA. The first report discusses CMS efforts to establish federally-facilitated exchanges in 34 states that will not operate a state-based exchange for 2014. A companion report examines federal and state efforts to implement insurance exchanges for small businesses, known as Small Business Health Options Programs, or SHOPs. In short, the GAO concluded that while much progress has been made, much remains to be accomplished in a relatively-short timeframe in the areas of eligibility and enrollment, plan management (including certification of Qualified Health plans), and consumer assistance. The GAO could not determine whether CMS contingency planning “will assure the timely and smooth implementation of the exchanges by October 2013.”
The Government Accountability Office (GAO) has identified shortcomings in CMS’s implementation of accreditation requirements for suppliers of advanced diagnostic imaging (ADI) services under the Medicare Improvements for Patients and Providers Act of 2008 (MIPPA). For instance, the GAO found significant differences among the accrediting organizations arising from the lack of minimum national standards, rendering it difficult for CMS to monitor and assess such factors as qualifications of technologists and medical directors and the quality of clinical images. The GAO also reports that CMS’s oversight of the accreditation requirement is limited, with the initial focus on ensuring that claims were paid only to accredited suppliers. According to the GAO, CMS has not developed an oversight framework that would enable it to monitor and measure performance. The three accrediting organizations for ADI facilities approved by CMS are the American College of Radiology, the Intersociety Accreditation Commission and The Joint Commission (TJC). One area of controversy in the report involves the GAO’s criticism of TJC’s accreditation program for having less focus on imaging quality and physician qualifications than the other two accrediting organizations, assertions the TJC strongly contested. The GAO recommends that CMS: publish minimum national standards for the accreditation of ADI suppliers; develop an oversight framework for evaluating accrediting organization performance; develop more specific requirements for accrediting organization audits; and clarify guidance on immediate-jeopardy deficiencies. HHS concurred with the recommendations.
The GAO has issued a report on the methodology CMS uses to calculate a risk adjustment for Medicare Advantage (MA) plans, updating an analysis in provided in January 2012. The GAO previously reported that differences in diagnostic coding between MA plans and Medicare FFS resulted in inaccurately-high MA risk scores and excessive payments to MA plans. While CMS made an adjustment for coding differences in 2010, the GAO concluded that the adjustments were insufficient. Based on an analysis of two years of data available since the GAO completed its analysis for the January 2012 report, the GAO found that the cumulative impact of coding differences on risk scores increased from 2010 through 2012, and that CMS's adjustment to risk scores to account for diagnostic coding differences was too low. The GAO estimates that as a result, at least $3.2 billion in excess payments were made to MA plans over three years. The GAO continues to recommend that CMS update its methodology to more accurately account for differences in diagnostic coding between MA plans and Medicare FFS.
A recent GAO report found that CMS’s Medicare low-volume payment adjustment (LVPA) for dialysis facilities has not been effectively targeted at low-volume facilities with high costs. Specifically, based on a review of claims and cost reports, the GAO estimates that Medicare overpaid about $5.3 million in 2011 to dialysis facilities that were ineligible for the LVPA, but did not pay an estimated $6.7 million to facilities that were eligible. In addition, in 2011 almost 30% of LVPA-eligible facilities were located within 1 mile of another facility and more than half were within 5 miles, which the GAO believes indicates that the facilities “might not have been necessary for ensuring access to care.” The GAO also asserts that the LVPA program “gives facilities an adverse incentive to restrict service provision” since facilities could lose substantial Medicare revenues if they reach the program’s treatment threshold. To more effectively target the LVPA and promote payment accuracy, the GAO recommends that CMS, among other things, restrict payments to low-volume facilities that are isolated; consider changing the LVPA to a tiered adjustment to reduce the incentive for facilities to restrict service provision to avoid reaching the treatment threshold; recoup LVPA payments made in error; and improve guidance. HHS generally concurred with the recommendations.
In response to a request from Rep. Henry Waxman, Ranking Member of the House Committee on Energy and Commerce, the GAO has issued a report examining Pharmacy Services Administrative Organizations (PSAOs), which are used primarily by independent pharmacies to interact with drug wholesalers, third-party payers, and other entities. The report includes data from 2011 and 2012 regarding:
- the number of PSAOs (at least 22) and the number of pharmacies that contract with PSAOs (between 20,275 and 28,343);
- the services PSAOs offer (including contract negotiation, communication, and help-desk services, among others) and how they are paid for these services (usually a monthly fee for a bundle of services paid by a member pharmacy); and
- the entities that own PSAOs (the majority are owned by drug wholesalers and independent pharmacy cooperatives) and the relationships between owners and the pharmacies they represent (which vary).
The GAO has examined how private-sector efforts to adjust physician payments to reflect quality and efficiency could be applied successfully to the Medicare program. As previously reported, CMS developing a physician value-based payment modifier (Value Modifier), which was mandated by the ACA as a way to reward physicians for providing higher quality and more efficient care. The Medicare Value Modifier is being phased in from 2015 to 2017, with 2013 serving as the initial performance period for the 2015 Value Modifier. Under the final 2013 Medicare physician fee schedule rule, the Value Modifier initially will apply to all groups of physician with 100 or more eligible professionals. These groups will be able to choose two payment calculation options: (1) Value Modifier based strictly on participation in the Physician Quality Reporting System, or (2) Value Modifier based on quality tiering, with payments based on quality and costs. Based on a review of successful private-sector practices, the GAO recommends that CMS: consider rewarding physicians for performance improvement in addition to meeting absolute benchmarks; make more timely Medicare payment adjustments to enhance the significance of the incentive to physicians; and develop a strategy to reliably measure the performance of solo or small group practices. HHS concurred with the recommendations.
The GAO has issued a report examining selected consumer protection requirements for dual eligible beneficiaries -- low-income seniors and individuals with disabilities enrolled in both Medicare and Medicaid. The report summarizes such consumer protections for dual eligible beneficiaries (e.g., access to primary care providers, appeals processes) in the Medicare fee-for-service (FFS) and Medicare Advantage programs, along with Medicaid FFS and managed care plans. The report also highlights compliance and enforcement actions taken by CMS and selected states against managed care plans to help ensure that MA and Medicaid managed care organizations complied with relevant consumer protection requirements. For details, see the complete report, “Medicare and Medicaid: Consumer Protection Requirements Affecting Dual-Eligible Beneficiaries Vary across Programs, Payment Systems, and States.”
In light of a continued high rate of Medicare fee-for-service improper payments (8.6% in FY 2011), the GAO recently assessed the use of Medicare prepayment edits and CMS's oversight of Medicare Administrative Contractors (MACs) that process claims. In the report, "Medicare Program Integrity: Greater Prepayment Control Efforts Could Increase Savings and Better Ensure Proper Payment," the GAO estimates that while the use of prepayment edits saved Medicare at least $1.76 billion in FY 2010, it believes savings could have been greater if prepayment edits had been more widely used. For instance, the GAO found more than $100 million in Medicare payments that were inconsistent with a sample of three local coverage determinations (pertaining to monitored anesthesia care, parathormone, and noninvasive cerebrovascular studies) and that could have been identified using automated edits. The GAO also found weaknesses associated with CMS edit processes based on national policies, such as lack of specific time frames for implementing edits, flaws in the structure of some edits, and lack of centralized implementation. GAO recommends that CMS take a series of steps to strengthen its use of prepayment edits, such as implementing medically unlikely edits that assess all quantities provided to the same beneficiary by the same provider on the same day; encouraging more information sharing about effective edits, and assessing the feasibility of increasing incentives for edit use. HHS generally agreed with the recommendations.
A recent GAO report, “Medicaid Integrity Program: CMS Should Take Steps to Eliminate Duplication and Improve Efficiency,” points to a number of shortcomings in CMS Medicaid program integrity efforts. Among other things, the GAO found that Medicaid Integrity Group's (MIG) oversight and support activities had mixed results in achieving the goal of enhancing program integrity efforts. Moreover, the MIG’s hiring of separate review and audit contractors for its National Medicaid Audit Program was inefficient and duplicative. The GAO recommends that CMS: eliminate duplication by merging contractor functions, use comprehensive reviews to better target audits; work with states to ensure reliable reporting of their program integrity recoveries; discontinue state program integrity assessments that overlap other, more current data sources; and reevaluate its return on investment methodology.
The Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health (HITECH) Act provided funding to promote the adoption and meaningful use of certified EHR technology, including a Medicaid EHR program. In 2011, the first year of the Medicaid EHR program, 1,964 hospitals and 45,962 professionals were awarded a total of approximately $2.7 billion in Medicaid EHR incentive payments, according to a GAO report describing the characteristics of providers that participated in the program in 2011. Hospitals claimed $1.7 billion in these Medicaid EHR incentive payments, with a median payment amount of $613,512. Almost half of the hospitals (46%) receiving payments were located in the south, while the smallest proportion (15%) were located in the northeast. Also among hospitals receiving payments, 62% were located in urban areas, 80% were acute care hospitals, 57% percent were nonprofits, and 57% were not members of a chain, while hospitals with the highest number of total beds were twice as likely to receive an incentive payment than those with the fewest number of beds. With regard to professionals, who were awarded a total of $967 million in incentive payments, more than three times as many eligible professionals participated in the Medicaid EHR program than in the Medicare EHR program. The largest proportion of professionals who received a Medicaid EHR incentive payment for 2011 were in the south (37%), compared to 20% in the midwest. As with hospitals, most professionals receiving EHR incentive payments (83%) were located in urban areas. Additional details can be found in the full report, “Electronic Health Records: Number and Characteristics of Providers Awarded Medicaid Incentive Payments for 2011."